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Note 
 
“Don’t Read This If It’s Not for You”:  
The Legal Inadequacies of Modern Approaches to 
E-mail Privacy 
Joshua L. Colburn∗ 
For many, electronic mail (e-mail) has become an inte-
grated component of daily life. With no postage and the promise 
of a virtually instant reply time, it is no wonder that e-mail 
volume has increased from 5.1 million messages in 2000 to 
135.6 million messages in 2005.1 Unfortunately, many users 
cling to a false sense of security associated with e-mail’s wide-
spread acceptance as a legitimate communication medium.2 In 
an effort to limit liability and increase privacy, a growing num-
ber of e-mailers have incorporated disclaimers into their mes-
sages.3 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2003, 
University of Minnesota: Institute of Technology. The author thanks Dean 
Joan Howland for her advice and guidance, Lorre and Vicki Colburn for their 
loving support, and the outstanding editors and staff of the Minnesota Law 
Review. In addition, the author extends special thanks to Mark Karon for his 
topic development assistance. Copyright © 2006 by Joshua L. Colburn. 
 1. Lizzette Alvarez, Got 2 Extra Hours for Your E-mail?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2005, at G1. 
 2. CHRISTINA CAVANAGH, MANAGING YOUR E-MAIL: THINKING OUTSIDE 
THE BOX 46 (2003) (“We have fooled ourselves into regarding our e-mail corre-
spondence as we would a conversation—a surrogate for a more personal ex-
change like the telephone or face-to-face.”). 
 3. See CATHERINE SANDERS REACH ET AL., A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES. 
CTR., 2006 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CEN-
TER SURVEY REPORT: WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY TREND REPORT 
13 (2006) (reporting that seventy-six percent of firms surveyed “use confiden-
tiality statements as a security precaution”). 
For an example of a typical disclaimer, examine the following suggested e-
mail footer: 
This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and are 
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they 
are addressed. This communication may contain material protected 
by the attorney-client privilege. If you are not the intended recipient 
or the person responsible for delivering the e-mail to the intended re-
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A possible explanation for the increasing popularity of e-
mail disclaimers may be the recent adoption of e-mail in the le-
gal community.4 As the new millennium approached, lawyers 
were still debating the prudence of practicing law over the 
Internet.5 When lawyers finally started to use e-mail,6 many 
practitioners copied the privilege and confidentiality disclaim-
ers from their letters and faxes into their e-mail messages.7 Be-
cause these adapted e-mail disclaimers derive from legal obli-
gations unique to the legal profession,8 the effectiveness of 
disclaimers outside the legal profession dissipates.9 Therefore, 
contrary to popular belief,10 adding privacy disclaimers to busi-
ness and personal e-mail messages has no legal effect.11 
This Note takes a practical look at the legal foundations of 
e-mail disclaimers and argues that, outside the attorney-client 
relationship, disclaimers are generally unenforceable and, 
 
cipient, be advised that you have received this e-mail in error and 
that any use, dissemination, forwarding, printing, or copying of this e-
mail is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, 
please immediately notify _____ by telephone at _____. You will be re-
imbursed for reasonable costs incurred in notifying us. 
MICHAEL R. OVERLY, E-POLICY: HOW TO DEVELOP COMPUTER, E-MAIL, AND 
INTERNET GUIDELINES TO PROTECT YOUR COMPANY AND ITS ASSETS 68–69 
(1999). 
 4. See John Christopher Anderson, Transmitting Legal Documents over 
the Internet: How to Protect Your Client and Yourself, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2001) (“The use of e-mail and Internet technology in law 
firms has exploded over the last ten years.”); Sherry L. Talton, Mapping the 
Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail and the Inadvertent Disclosure of 
Confidential Information, 20 REV. LITIG. 271, 272 (2000) (“E-mail will replace 
paper correspondence and radically alter the practice of law.”). 
 5. Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort: Careless Internet Habits Can 
Open Your Firm to Malpractice, ARK. LAW., Spring 2004, at 25, 25 (noting that 
some firms were known to block e-mail usage among their attorneys out of 
concern for disclosure of client information). 
 6.  A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., JUNE 2000 TELEPHONE SURVEY: HOW 
ATTORNEYS USE E-MAIL, http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/surveys/june2000 
.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (finding that ninety-four percent of attorneys 
participating in a random phone survey use e-mail in their practices). 
 7. Krause, supra note 5, at 29. 
 8. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006) (“A law-
yer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s cli-
ent and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadver-
tently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”). 
 9. See CAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 47 (“You have no control over your 
recipients’ decisions to forward your messages to others without your knowl-
edge or consent.”). 
 10. See MATT HAIG, E-MAIL ESSENTIALS 76 (2001). 
 11. See CAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 47. 
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therefore, ineffective. Part I of this Note presents a brief back-
ground of similar disclaimers in other forms of communication, 
including traditional mail and facsimiles. Part II provides a 
summary of existing privacy law and explains the limits of its 
applicability to e-mail, including the unique role of e-mail pri-
vacy disclaimers in the legal profession. Part III examines the 
possible extra-legal benefits of including a disclaimer and sug-
gests a few best practices for maximizing effect and enforceabil-
ity. Part IV describes a proposal to modify current practices 
and update existing law in an effort to achieve increased e-mail 
privacy. This Note concludes that a majority of the common 
provisions of e-mail disclaimers are unenforceable and that e-
mail encryption is a viable and substantially more secure al-
ternative. 
I.  THE DISCLAIMER AS A PRIVACY TOOL   
The risks associated with communicating confidential in-
formation are apparent in various contexts. An attorney is sub-
ject to reprimand or even malpractice liability by exposing con-
fidential or privileged information.12 An employee disclosing 
sensitive material may face dismissal or legal action.13 There is 
no telling how much embarrassment or scrutiny an individual 
might encounter when private communications become pub-
lic.14  
Because communications privacy had been a general con-
cern well before the proliferation of e-mail, e-mailers under-
standably look to older forms of communication for effective se-
curity solutions. With e-mail, however, “it is very easy to click 
on the wrong name and send the message to an unintended 
 
 12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). See generally Daniel 
L. Draisen, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Their Relationship 
to Legal Malpractice Actions: A Practical Approach to the Use of the Rules, 21 
J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 67 (1997) (explaining that punishments for attorneys range 
from private reprimands to complete disbarment). 
 13. AM. MGMT. ASS’N & EPOLICY INST., 2004 WORKPLACE E-MAIL AND IN-
STANT MESSAGING SURVEY SUMMARY 6–7 (2004), available at http://www 
.epolicyinstitute.com/survey/survey04.pdf (finding that twenty-five percent of 
employers surveyed had terminated “an employee for violating e-mail policy”). 
 14. See Ann Carrns, Those Bawdy E-mails Were Good for a Laugh—Until 
the Ax Fell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at A1 (reporting that improper contents 
of e-mail messages resulted in the firing of nearly two dozen New York Times 
employees). 
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person.” Thus, e-mail garners more disclosure anxiety than 
traditional forms of communication.15 
A. THE FACSIMILE: E-MAIL’S OLDER SIBLING? 
With the introduction of the facsimile, the ease of sending 
information to the wrong recipient changed from a matter of 
writing the wrong address to mistyping a single digit. Because 
a cover sheet disclaimer is “virtually all you can do to ensure 
that a recipient who gets it incorrectly knows not to read the 
fax,”16 lawyers have included disclaimers on facsimiles for quite 
some time.17 The insecure practice of receiving faxes in a com-
mon area prompted the Minnesota State Lawyers Professional 
Responsibility Board to issue an opinion in 1999, distinguishing 
facsimiles from other, more acceptable, means of communicat-
ing confidential client information.18 
In order to maximize enforceability, facsimile confidential-
ity disclaimers generally appear at the beginning of the mes-
sage.19 In fact, one commentator advises attorneys to “make it a 
practice to use a coversheet containing these confidential leg-
ends every time they send a fax containing privileged informa-
tion.”20 While such a coversheet provides notice to all readers, 
lawyers are under an additional ethical obligation to return a 
missent communication to opposing counsel without examining 
it.21 Though this obligation is most commonly associated with 
faxes, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct extend this duty to the receipt of any missent 
 
 15. OVERLY, supra note 3, at 13. 
 16. Abdon M. Pallasch, Fax Cover Sheets Carry Dire Warnings for Law 
and Lasagna, CHI. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 14, 15. 
 17. See Tracy Thompson et al., Ethical Issues for Employment Lawyers, in 
664 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION COURSE HANDBOOK 859, 876 
(2001) (noting the popularity of confidentiality disclaimers on legal fax cover 
sheets). 
 18. See Minn. State Lawyers Prof ’l Responsibility Bd., Op. 19 cmt. (1999) 
[hereinafter Minn. Ethics Op. 19] (“With facsimile machines, the concerns are 
less with interception than with unintended dissemination of the communica-
tion at its destination, where the communication may be received in a common 
area of the workplace or home and may be read by persons other than the in-
tended recipient.”). 
 19. See Krause, supra note 5, at 29. 
 20. Anne G. Bruckner-Harvey, Inadvertent Disclosure in the Age of Fax 
Machines: Is the Cat Really out of the Bag?, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 385, 397 (1994). 
 21. See Pallasch, supra note 16, at 15, 73. 
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“document.”22 However, it is important to recall that confiden-
tiality concerns extend well beyond the limited realm of lawyer-
lawyer and lawyer-client communication.23 
B.  THE ARGUMENT FOR DISCLAIMERS ON E-MAIL MESSAGES 
If one considers e-mail just another form of written com-
munication, many of the justifications for fax disclaimers are 
readily applicable. In fact, the State Bar of Michigan’s Commit-
tee on Professional and Judicial Ethics equated e-mail commu-
nication to postcards or facsimile transmissions as early as 
1996.24 Much like a fax or postcard, “simple e-mail generally is 
not ‘sealed’ or secure.”25 Difficulties similar to those posed by 
receiving faxes in a common area26 can also arise in a business 
environment when curious or disgruntled employees intercept 
an e-mail communication discussing sensitive matters such as 
a “proposed sale of the business or employee termination is-
sues.”27 With e-mail, this threat also exists outside the office, 
where messages may be readily “accessed or viewed on inter-
mediate computers between the sender and recipient.”28 Be-
cause of this vulnerability, “[e]-mail not only can be, but is in-
tercepted with surprising frequency.”29 By contrast, facsimiles 
travel directly over the telephone line from sender to recipient 
and leave no intermediate copies behind. Moreover, a fax’s 
readability quickly deteriorates across multiple transmissions, 
while an e-mail remains clear and legible after retransmission 
to an unlimited number of recipients.30 Due to e-mail’s digital 
 
 22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2006) (“A lawyer who 
receives a document relating to the representation of a lawyer’s client and 
knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent 
shall promptly notify the sender.”). 
 23. See NANCY FLYNN, THE EPOLICY HANDBOOK 3–9 (2001) (arguing that 
every organization should have e-mail, Internet, and software policies). 
 24. See Mich. Comm. on Prof ’l Responsibility & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-
276 (1996), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_ 
opinions/ri-276.htm. 
 25. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 
1996), aff ’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 26. See Minn. Ethics Op. 19, supra note 18. 
 27. See Brett R. Harris, Counseling Clients over the Internet, COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAW., Aug. 2001, at 4, 5. 
 28. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834; accord Anderson, supra note 4, at 4 (“Be-
cause e-mail is transmitted over an ‘open network,’ electronic documents 
travel through countless interconnected computers on their Internet voyage.”). 
 29. Anderson, supra note 4, at 7. 
 30. See OVERLY, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
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format, degradation of quality over an enormous number of 
forwards is not an issue.31 
In addition, the unique properties of e-mail introduce sev-
eral new concerns, including fresh ways to dispatch a message 
to an unintended third party. For example, the relative ease of 
“spoofing,” or making a message appear to be from someone 
else, creates the possibility that replying to an existing e-mail 
can result in disclosure of private information to an unintended 
recipient.32 Hitting the reply button is considerably simpler 
than typing an incorrect seven- or ten-digit number into a fax 
machine. Therefore, a truly effective e-mail disclaimer should 
protect against more than the accidental misaddress of a mes-
sage. 
The various practical differences between faxes and e-mail 
messages are substantial enough to challenge the sufficiency of 
copying a fax disclaimer into an e-mail verbatim.33 Further-
more, while facsimile disclaimers have yet to work their way 
into non-legal faxes, business and personal e-mail disclaimers 
appear to be quite popular.34 This growth is overzealous, how-
ever, as the legal foundation for e-mail privacy disclaimers is 
difficult to identify.35 
II.  SEARCHING FOR A FOUNDATION   
Most e-mail disclaimers suggest a level of legal support, 
but do not specifically reference any statutes or specific legal 
principles.36 In fact, despite the common disclaimer language 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Harris, supra note 27, at 6–7 (describing the potential for “spoofing”); 
see also Anderson, supra note 4, at 14 (“E-mail with a falsified return address 
may be used to trick an e-mail recipient into releasing confidential informa-
tion.”). 
 33. Compare OVERLY, supra note 3, at 10–12 (describing the characteris-
tics of e-mail), with Pallasch, supra note 16, at 14–15 (discussing facsimile 
cover sheet warnings). 
 34. REACH, supra note 3, at 13 (reporting that seventy-six percent of firms 
surveyed “use confidentiality statements as a security precaution”). 
 35. Claire Smith, Confusion Rules on Disclaimers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2005, 2005 WLNR 20764252 (“The validity of disclaimers is as yet largely un-
tested.”). 
 36. Consider, for example, this disclaimer suggested to academic advisors 
by the University of Maryland Campus Legal Office: 
This message and any included attachments are property of the Uni-
versity of Maryland, College Park, and are intended only for the ad-
dressee(s). The information contained herein may include trade se-
crets or privileged or otherwise confidential information. 
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that certain actions are “strictly prohibited”37 or “may be 
unlawful,”38 courts have yet to address the enforceability of a 
privacy disclaimer in the context of electronic mail. Therefore, 
this Note addresses the likely legal arguments favoring the 
most common provisions of e-mail disclaimers. 
A. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(ECPA),39 an extension of the Federal Wiretap Statute of 
1968,40 provides the best foundation for a claim to e-mail pri-
vacy. Congress passed the ECPA in response to a study show-
ing the potential threats that new technologies posed to the 
civil liberties of the citizenry.41 The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee reported that while a first class letter was “afforded a high 
level of protection against unauthorized opening,” there were 
“no comparable . . . statutory standards to protect the privacy 
and security of communications transmitted by . . . new forms 
of telecommunications and computer technology.”42 Therefore, 
the ECPA makes unauthorized interception of e-mail subject to 
a $500 fine, not more than five years in prison, or both.43 The 
concept of the ECPA was apparently persuasive, as many 
states have independently adopted most if not all of its provi-
sions.44 
 
Unauthorized review, forwarding, printing, copying, distributing, or 
using such information is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If 
you received this message in error, or have reason to believe you are 
not authorized to receive it, please promptly delete this message and 
notify the sender by e-mail. Thank you. 
Univ. of Md. Coll. of Agric. & Natural Res., Email Disclaimers, ADVISOR’S AD-
VISOR, Jan. 2005, http://www.agnr.umd.edu/AGNRnews/Article.cfm?&ID= 
4368&NL=87 [hereinafter Univ. of Md. Coll. of Agric. & Natural Res., Email 
Disclaimers] (emphasis added). 
 37. See, e.g., OVERLY, supra note 3, at 69. 
 38. See, e.g., Traversio, Email Disclaimer, http://www.traversio.com/ 
traversio/corporate_legal_disclaimer.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Univ. of 
Md. Coll. of Agric. & Natural Res., Email Disclaimers, supra note 36. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 211–25 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2000)); see Harris, supra note 27, at 5. 
 41. 132 CONG. REC. H4045 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeier) (acknowledging that the ECPA “grew out of extensive hearings 
and an Office of Technology Assessment study”); OVERLY, supra note 3, at 25. 
 42. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a)–5(b) (2000); OVERLY, supra note 3, at 26. 
 44. See, e.g., Privacy of Communications Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.01–.41 
(2004). 
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An important limitation of the ECPA, however, is that it 
only applies to the “interception” of electronic communication.45 
The statute itself defines “intercept” to be “the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral com-
munication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device.”46 Nonetheless, courts have thoroughly discussed 
the meaning of interception under the ECPA. 
For example, the Eighth Circuit restricted the definition of 
interception under the earlier Federal Wiretap Statute to ac-
tion taken with “bad purpose . . . , without justifiable ex-
cuse . . . , stubbornly, obstinately or perversely.”47 Under this 
definition, accidental e-mail recipients, who likely possess none 
of these attributes, would not qualify as interceptors under the 
ECPA. Because the ECPA restricts only the interception of 
electronic communications, accidental recipients would be free 
to do what they please with the contents of the message with-
out fear of violating the statute.48 
Courts have limited the applicability of the ECPA by find-
ing that electronic communications that have reached their 
destination are ineligible for interception and, therefore, are 
outside the protections of the ECPA.49 In 1998, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the determination that a person “can disclose or 
use with impunity the contents of an electronic communication 
unlawfully obtained from electronic storage.”50 The Eleventh 
Circuit followed suit in 2003 by agreeing that interception un-
der the ECPA only occurs when a communication is in transit.51 
Due to this “contemporaneous interception”52 requirement, the 
ECPA apparently does not protect electronic communications 
that have reached any destination, let alone those that have 
reached the incorrect destination. Because an e-mail must 
 
 45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (limiting applicability to “any person 
who . . . intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other 
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any . . . electronic communication” 
(emphasis added)). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000). 
 47. See United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting 
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933)). 
 48. See CAVANAGH, supra note 2, at 47 (describing an e-mail recipient’s 
ability to do various things with received e-mail messages). 
 49. See Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (Del. 1997), aff ’d, 172 
F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1040 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 52. Id. at 1039. 
COLBURN_5FMT 12/1/2006 9:02:14 AM 
2006] E-MAIL PRIVACY 249 
 
reach a destination before a human recipient will read any dis-
claimer attached to it, the ECPA likely lends no authority to 
disclaimers that claim legal power over the actions of a recipi-
ent. Furthermore, the ECPA does not protect the copies an e-
mail leaves on servers as it travels to its destination,53 copies 
which are not themselves traveling.54 
In addition to its failings in the realm of delivered e-mail, 
the ECPA contains an exception that significantly weakens the 
level of protection that it provides to e-mail messages that ac-
tually are in transit. Commonly referred to as the “provider ex-
emption,”55 it allows electronic communication service provid-
ers to “intercept, disclose, or use” communications sent through 
their facilities.56 Therefore, the ECPA explicitly permits Inter-
net service providers, employers, and various other e-mail pro-
viders to monitor any e-mail that travels on or through their in-
ternal network systems, notwithstanding any attached privacy 
disclaimers. Because of the open-network nature of the Inter-
net, e-mail messages commonly travel on a provider’s network 
without either originating from or terminating at an address on 
that same network.57 Consequently, the ECPA permits provid-
ers to peer into mere pass-through e-mail traffic. Thus, the 
ECPA, through its limited scope and provider exemption, pro-
vides little protection to standard e-mail traffic. 
While analogies between postal mail and e-mail are accu-
rate to a point, the ECPA is sorely ill-equipped to fulfill its pur-
pose of placing e-mail on the same protective plane as postal 
mail. Unfortunately, the ECPA neglects the fact that the way 
modern e-mail systems work is rather similar to storing one’s 
postal mail in a giant mailbox at the end of the driveway. The 
ECPA not only does not require disclaimers, but it also lends no 
substantive support to e-mail privacy disclaimers. Because the 
 
 53. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 54. See Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1040; Wesley Coll., 974 F. Supp. at 391. 
 55. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 874. 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000) (“It shall not be unlawful under this 
chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a 
provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used 
in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, dis-
close, or use that communication.”); see also Jon Swartz, Boeing Scandal High-
lights E-mail Checks, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2005, at 5B (“Monitoring employee 
e-mail is becoming the norm in Corporate America.”). See generally FLYNN, 
supra note 23, at 34 (“According to the [ECPA], an employer-provided com-
puter system is the property of the employer.”). 
 57. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
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ECPA neither mentions nor supports e-mail disclaimers, one 
must locate a more creative foundation for e-mail privacy. 
B. COPYRIGHT 
Federal copyright law provides another possible legal basis 
for e-mail privacy.58 One commentator suggests that “[t]he in-
stant you finish typing a message, the e-mail is protected under 
federal copyright law.”59 He further asserts that registration 
and copyright notice are “not necessary” to reserve one’s copy-
right in a message.60 Under this assessment, copyright appears 
to be an e-mail privacy panacea. However, the value of copy-
right as an e-mail privacy tool is overstated.61 
Registration is not, in fact, required to invoke copyright 
protection, but it is required to file an infringement suit.62 
Therefore, to assert copyright protection as a basis for e-mail 
privacy without actually registering is, realistically, an idle 
threat. For most e-mailers, it is implausible to consider paying 
a thirty dollar copyright registration fee for each private com-
munication.63 
Even if a user manages to get past the registration hurdle, 
the nature of copyright law itself provides another bar to en-
forcement. A cause of action for copyright infringement also re-
quires that the infringer actually violate the owner’s copyright 
rights.64 This action may include copying the work or distribut-
ing it, but simple disclosure of an e-mail’s contents does not ap-
pear to qualify as infringement.65 Though copyright appears to 
 
 58. See OVERLY, supra note 3, at 47. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Copyright in E-mail, 5 J. ELEC. PUBL. (1999), 
http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/05-01/field.html (“Copyright should have no 
bearing on the use of messages never intended for public distribution.”). 
 62. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (2005) (“No action for infringement of the copy-
right in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this ti-
tle.”). 
 63. See Marybeth Peters, Analysis and Proposed Copyright Fee Schedule 
to Go into Effect July 1, 2002, at 9–10 (2002), http://www.copyright.gov/ 
reports/fees2002.pdf (noting that increasing copyright registration fees have 
been accompanied by diminishing numbers of copyright registrations). 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer.”); Field, supra note 61. 
 65. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (enumerating the rights of a copy-
right owner). 
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be a creative way to fill in a few of the holes in the ECPA, it is 
by no means a complete patch. 
C. FULFILLING A DUTY 
Some e-mail disclaimers are nothing more than a response 
to a legal duty to identify certain communications as confiden-
tial.66 Because “no cases directly address whether e-mail sent 
over the Internet is subject to a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy,”67 senders are arguably prudent to proceed as if there is 
no such expectation. Often, the inclusion of an appropriate e-
mail disclaimer satisfies certain duties of nondisclosure. For 
example, the Internal Revenue Service’s recent revisions to its 
Circular 230 require the inclusion of a disclaimer with written 
statements about specific federal tax issues.68 Under such cir-
cumstances, the inclusion of an e-mail privacy disclaimer is 
both necessary and appropriate.69 Ordinary business and per-
sonal e-mail messages, however, do not have any such statu-
tory requirements. 
Considering the duties of confidentiality imposed on other 
industries, the legal community’s concerns over e-mail commu-
nication are readily visible. These concerns are likely due to the 
legal community’s direct involvement in the issue of confidenti-
ality. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct place a general burden of confidentiality on an 
attorney regarding “information relating to representation of a 
client,”70 and disclosure may subject a lawyer to malpractice 
proceedings or sanctions.71 
Much of the discussion of e-mail privacy has surrounded 
the maintenance of attorney-client privilege. Because the law 
governing waiver of privilege through inadvertent disclosure is 
in a “state of flux,” the effectiveness of including a disclaimer 
 
 66. A.B.A. LEGAL TECH. RES. CTR., supra note 6. 
 67. Talton, supra note 4, at 271. 
 68. See Jane Pribek, New Trend: Law Firms Have Their Own ‘In-House’ 
Counsel, MINN. LAW., Sept. 26, 2005, at S-1, available at 2005 WLNR 
15313245. 
 69. Id.; see also Letter from McNair Law Firm, P.A. to Its Clients, IRS 
Circular 230 and Its Impacts, http://www.mcnair.net/230.pdf (explaining its 
inclusion of a disclaimer confirming with the requirements of Circular 230) 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
 70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006) (“A lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the 
client consents after consultation.”). 
 71. See Draisen, supra note 12, at 67. 
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very much depends on the law of the applicable jurisdiction.72 
For all jurisdictions, a communication must satisfy three crite-
ria in order to be eligible for privilege protection: the client 
must have intended it to be confidential, the client’s expecta-
tion of confidentiality must be reasonable under the circum-
stances, and the confidentiality must have been subsequently 
maintained.73 
There are three categories of attorney-client privilege ju-
risdiction: strict responsibility, balancing, and no-waiver.74 In a 
strict responsibility jurisdiction, the existence of a disclaimer 
will do nothing to maintain privilege because disclosure alone 
waives the privilege.75 In a balancing jurisdiction, the inclusion 
of an attorney-client privilege disclaimer will weigh in favor of 
maintaining the privilege in the case of an inadvertent disclo-
sure.76 In a no-waiver jurisdiction, a disclaimer is superfluous 
as long as the sender did not intend to waive the privilege.77 
While failure to assert attorney-client privilege has resulted in 
waiver,78 it is important to note that the inclusion of a dis-
claimer apparently does no harm in any of the three classes of 
jurisdiction. 
In 1998, the American Bar Association adopted Resolution 
98A119A, urging the courts to afford e-mail communication 
“the same expectations of privacy and confidentiality as those 
accorded traditional means of communication.”79 A strict inter-
pretation of this classification suggests that the ABA considers 
e-mail to be as secure as sending a letter through the postal 
service, where disclaimers are rarely used. A year later, the 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility built upon Resolution 98A119A in Formal Opinion 99-
413 by addressing the confidentiality of unencrypted e-mail.80 
 
 72. See Talton, supra note 4, at 274. 
 73. Id. at 288–89. 
 74. Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 20, at 393. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding 
that a lack of evidence that the defendants asserted a claim of attorney-client 
privilege with respect to computer material precluded a later assertion of 
privilege). 
 79. Harris, supra note 27, at 10; see also A.B.A., POLICY & PROCEDURES 
HANDBOOK 276 (2005–06). 
 80. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 
(1999) [hereinafter Formal Op. 99-413]. 
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Formal Opinion 99-413 states that “[a] lawyer may transmit in-
formation relating to the representation of a client by unen-
crypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . because the mode of 
transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a 
technological and legal standpoint.”81 However, the Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility bases much of its 
conclusion on the presumption that the “unauthorized intercep-
tion or dissemination of the information is a violation of [the 
ECPA].”82 As discussed above in Part II.A., courts have held the 
ECPA to restrict the dissemination of only intercepted informa-
tion.83 Nonetheless, the Committee asserts the contrary conclu-
sion that the ECPA somehow bars the disclosure of stored in-
formation.84 
Despite the Committee’s questionable assumption regard-
ing the scope of the ECPA, Formal Opinion 99-413 prescribes 
that “[p]articularly strong protective measures are warranted 
to guard against the disclosure of highly sensitive matters.”85 A 
disclaimer apparently does not qualify as a “particularly 
strong” measure, as the Committee only lists the avoidance of 
e-mail altogether as an example.86 
The Minnesota State Lawyers Professional Responsibility 
Board appears to agree with the ABA’s optimistic conclusions 
about the security of e-mail communications.87 In a comment to 
Opinion 19, the Board states that “[t]his opinion reflects the 
prevalent view of other states and technology experts, that 
communications by facsimile, e-mail, and digital cordless or cel-
lular phones, like those by mail and conventional corded tele-
phone, generally are considered secure.”88 In the same vein, one 
commentator suggests that attorneys “worry too much” about 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1046 (11th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1983); Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 
974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (Del. 1997), aff ’d, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 84. Compare Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 80 (applying the ECPA to 
“dissemination” independent of “interception”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)–(e) 
(2000) (addressing “disclosure” of intercepted information). 
 85. Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 80. 
 86. Id. (noting that e-mail should be avoided in situations that similarly 
“warrant the avoidance of the telephone, fax, and mail”). 
 87. Minn. Ethics Op. 19, supra note 18. 
 88. Id. 
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Internet security,89 but, much like ABA Opinion 99-413,90 these 
aging and naïve conclusions fail to consider the reality of e-mail 
insecurity. 
Despite this insecurity, an e-mail disclaimer as a claim of 
privilege has merit on its own. For example, in United States v. 
Neill, the D.C. District Court found that a lack of evidence 
demonstrating that the defendant asserted a claim of privilege 
with respect to computer files precluded a later assertion of 
privilege.91 Under this rule, a disclaimer referencing privilege 
may insulate e-mail files from a default waiver of privilege. 
Among the various duty-based reasons for ensuring the 
privacy of an e-mail, maintaining attorney-client privilege is 
clearly of special importance to the legal community. Nonethe-
less, there is no explicit requirement or recognition of e-mail 
privacy disclaimers. In the face of a seemingly ethereal legal 
foundation, a prudent e-mail disclaimer user should take ad-
vantage of whatever means are available to strengthen the dis-
claimer’s effect. 
III.  STRENGTHENING THE BARK   
The “bark” of the disclaimer refers to its general effect in-
dependent of its legal underpinning. Even without a specific le-
gal foundation,92 disclaimers may arguably serve deterrent 
purposes through either the benevolence of others or fear of 
retribution.93 As a tool to limit dissemination of private infor-
mation, any warning should prove effective to a friendly recipi-
ent. However, some approaches to disclaimer usage are likely 
to be more effective than others. 
A. PLACEMENT 
The placement of a privacy disclaimer logically has an im-
pact on whether it is read before the recipient can “violate” its 
provisions. Nonetheless, most users place disclaimers of all 
 
 89. Anderson, supra note 4, at 7. 
 90. Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 80. 
 91. United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 92. See, e.g., STEVEN E. MILLER, CIVILIZING CYBERSPACE: POLICY, POWER, 
AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 362 (1996) (“The status of email is still 
in a state of legal confusion.”). 
 93. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ELEC-
TRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE 3 (1995) (“[T]he only security anyone has is based 
on the honesty, ignorance, and indifference of those at the intermediate 
points.”). 
COLBURN_5FMT 12/1/2006 9:02:14 AM 
2006] E-MAIL PRIVACY 255 
 
kinds at the end of their messages.94 This practice brings the 
effectiveness of such appended disclaimers into question. “One 
cannot unring a bell”; after the content of the e-mail is read, the 
damage is done.95 
Sensible practice would place the disclaimer at the begin-
ning of the document where readers are more likely to read it 
before they read the contents.96 This practice would better con-
form with the use of similar disclaimers in other forms of com-
munication. For asserting attorney-client privilege, an addi-
tional notice could be placed in the subject line indicating that 
the message is a privileged communication.97 
For maximum effectiveness, a user should place private in-
formation into a separate e-mail attachment.98 The body of the 
e-mail should contain only the disclaimer. The disclaimer 
should also appear at the top of the attached document. Users 
of this practice may encounter difficulties if different word-
processor programs are incompatible. However, a user may eas-
ily alleviate this problem through the use of a format that has a 
universal reader available, such as the portable document file 
(PDF) or rich-text format. 
Employing these practices would maximize the likelihood 
that the recipient notices and reads the disclaimer, regardless 
of whether the disclaimer is enforceable. Prominence and early 
placement create the greatest likelihood that an unintended re-
cipient will comply with a disclaimer. 
B. AUTOMATION 
The practice of placing the disclaimer at the end of the 
message99 is logically related to a tendency to simplify the dis-
claimer’s inclusion. Some law firms even configure their com-
puter systems to automatically place their own disclaimer at 
 
 94. Krause, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
 95. Talton, supra note 4, at 292. 
 96. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 877; Krause, supra note 5, at 
28–29 (comparing e-mail disclaimers which typically appear at the end of the 
message to fax disclaimers that typically appear before the message). 
 97. JONATHAN BICK, 101 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INTERNET 
LAW 32 (2000). 
 98. See Talton, supra note 4, at 304. 
 99. See, e.g., MONICA SEELEY & GERARD HARGREAVES, MANAGING IN THE 
EMAIL OFFICE 119 (2003) (advising organizations and individuals to “[s]et up 
your software’s signature feature to add letterhead details and any disclaimer 
to your messages automatically”). 
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the end of every outgoing e-mail message.100 Though admit-
tedly efficient, this approach may pose the greatest barrier to 
disclaimer effectiveness and enforceability. 
For commercial e-mail clients101 on the market today, the 
only way for an ordinary user to include text automatically in 
every message is to use a “signature.” As the name suggests, e-
mail clients provide an option to append a signature automati-
cally to the end of a message.102 This practice makes sense if 
one considers that software developers originally designed this 
feature to communicate a sender’s contact information.103 How-
ever, the automated signature feature is wholly inadequate for 
disclaimers. Until software designers create a plausible option 
to automatically insert text at the beginning of a message, ten-
sion will remain between the convenience of automation and 
the prudence of effective disclaimer placement. 
Authors who are opposed to automation believe that these 
types of disclaimers are meaningless to a court if a user in-
cludes them on every communication,104 including lunch ap-
pointments.105 Over-inclusion, they argue, can only result in a 
dilution of the already questionable legal meaning of e-mail 
disclaimers.106 
The possibility and potential consequences of forgetting a 
disclaimer on a single critical e-mail weighs heavily in favor of 
using automatic signatures to communicate disclaimers.107 
However, the possibility that overuse may indiscriminately in-
validate the same disclaimer on all of a user’s e-mail messages 
 
 100. Krause, supra note 5, at 29. 
 101. In this context a “client” is a software program used to interact with a 
server, such as an e-mail server. See JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, 
COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN APPROACH FEATURING THE INTERNET 
10–11 (2d ed. 2003). 
 102. See Microsoft Office Assistance, About Signatures in Messages, 
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/assistance/HP052427451033.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2006) (defining “e-mail signature” as “text and/or pictures that are 
automatically added to the end of an outgoing e-mail message”). 
 103. Microsoft Office Online, Format E-mail Messages for Clarity, 
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/FX011456181033.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 
2006) (suggesting that “the first place [e-mail recipients] look for your contact 
information is in the signature line at the end of your message” and that “[e]-
mail message signatures should display complete contact data, including 
name, title, phone numbers, organization, and Web site address”). 
 104. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 877. 
 105. See Krause, supra note 5, at 29. 
 106. Pallasch, supra note 16, at 15. 
 107. Id.  
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is far more devastating and should be sufficient to dissuade the 
average user from giving in to the simplistic appeal of automa-
tion.108 
C. PLAUSIBLE COMPLIANCE 
Two considerable issues arise when evaluating the plausi-
bility of a recipient’s compliance with the common provisions of 
an e-mail disclaimer. First, the recipient must determine the 
identity of the intended recipient.109 Second, if a recipient re-
solves that he is not the intended recipient, he must delete the 
message from his system.110 Because of the informal nature of 
e-mail,111 ascertaining the true intention of the sender may be 
quite difficult. Clearly, a greeting containing a name other than 
the name of the recipient indicates that a message is intended 
for someone else. However, a brief message between two well-
acquainted parties may not contain any information identifying 
the sender other than his e-mail address, let alone an indica-
tion of the intended recipient. In order to maximize the effect of 
a request to determine the intended recipient, senders should 
make the identity of their intended recipients unequivocally 
clear in the body of messages. 
Realistically, senders have no control over the actions of e-
mail recipients after receipt.112 What is worse, even if recipi-
ents follow instructions to delete the e-mail, multiple copies of 
the e-mail’s contents will likely remain elsewhere on the recipi-
ents’ systems.113 Therefore, the expectations associated with a 
disclaimer’s request for deletion are also unrealistic in practice.  
Through changes in placement and usage, users may be 
 
 108. See Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 877. 
 109. See Krause, supra note 5, at 28–29 (observing that the text of dis-
claimers typically claims that “[t]he above e-mail is for the intended recipient 
only”). 
 110. See, e.g., TD Bank Financial Group, Legal Notices and Disclaimers of 
Liability, http://www.td.com/legal/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (“If you 
receive this communication in error . . . permanently delete the entire commu-
nication from any computer, disk drive, or other storage medium.”). 
 111. OVERLY, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that the incorrectly perceived im-
permanence of e-mail is one reason people treat it so informally). 
 112. See id. at 12. (“[Y]ou have no control over whether that person keeps 
your message confidential or circulates it to any number of other people—or 
posts it on the Internet, where it may be viewed by thousands of people.”). 
 113. Id. at 11 (“People wrongly believe that if they delete a piece of e-mail 
it is gone forever.”); see also A.B.A. DIV. FOR MEDIA RELATIONS & COMMC’N. 
SERVS., FACTS ABOUT PRIVACY & CYBERSPACE 13 (1999) (“Deleted e-mail is 
often archived on tape and stored for years (deleting does not really delete).”). 
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able to bolster the effect of e-mail disclaimers that contain rea-
sonable provisions. However, without some legal support for e-
mail privacy, a disclaimer is nothing more than a hollow threat. 
While changes to the law are the most straightforward means 
of increasing legal support, alternatives exist. 
IV.  STRENGTHENING THE BITE   
The “bite” of an e-mail disclaimer refers to the actual legal 
impact of and obstacles to noncompliance. Two categories of e-
mail disclaimer bites exist: prevention and punishment. Effec-
tive prevention measures are proactive and preclude the unin-
tended recipient from disobeying the provisions of a disclaimer. 
In contrast, effective punishment measures are reactive and 
provide remedies or disincentives for the disobedient recipient. 
A. PREVENTION 
Two proactive privacy measures are presently available to 
users. First, recent advances in e-mail encryption software 
have made encryption a plausible way to maintain privacy at a 
reasonably high success rate.114 A second and much less imme-
diate option involves introducing better e-mail standards. If one 
of these options is adopted, it is likely that the other will be as 
well. 
1. Encryption 
Because of its effectiveness both in transit and after deliv-
ery, encryption is a powerful means of securing e-mail commu-
nications.115 Moreover, an encrypted message maintains pri-
vacy while requiring compliance on the part of an unintended 
recipient.116 Encryption involves scrambling a message before 
dispatch117 and transmitting the scrambled message to recipi-
ents who have unique keys that allow them to unscramble the 
message. In fact, deciphering a message coded by modern en-
cryption without a key can be so difficult that it takes a high-
 
 114. See SEELEY & HARGREAVES, supra note 99, at 201 (“[Encryption soft-
ware] is a relatively mature, albeit underused, form of email management.”). 
 115. Talton, supra note 4, at 284. 
 116. See LILIAN EDWARDS & CHARLOTTE WAELDE, LAW & THE INTERNET: 
REGULATING CYBERSPACE 141–47 (1997). 
 117. BICK, supra note 97, at 32 (explaining that encryption effectively ren-
ders a message “unintelligible to all those but the intended recipient”). 
COLBURN_5FMT 12/1/2006 9:02:14 AM 
2006] E-MAIL PRIVACY 259 
 
speed computer years of computing to solve.118 In addition to 
the added security encryption provides, the extra steps of 
scrambling and unscrambling allow for a more formal system of 
providing proof of receipt.119 
Today’s encryption software employs “public key” cryptog-
raphy to encode and decode messages.120 To decrypt encrypted 
e-mail messages, a user must acquire two keys: a public key 
and a private key.121 As the names suggest, users give their 
public keys to whomever they want to send encrypted messages 
and keep their private keys secret.122 After the public key is 
distributed, senders use it to encrypt messages to users, who 
decrypt all of the messages with their private keys.123 
A popular analogy explains encryption as a system of metal 
boxes and padlocks.124 The user distributes metal boxes and 
open padlocks (the public keys).125 The user has a special key 
(the private key) that opens all of the padlocks.126 Only the user 
has the private key, so once the senders lock their padlocks, 
only the user can access the contents.127 
Upon such a straightforward explanation, one begins to 
ponder how something as simple as acquiring a few keys and 
giving them to a user’s contacts is an obstacle to the wide-
spread adoption of something so secure. Consider, then, having 
to maintain a different key for every e-mail contact. For many 
users, that would be one very large, and very confusing, key 
 
 118. DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 290 (3d ed. 2000). 
 119. NANCY FLYNN & RANDOLPH KAHN, E-MAIL RULES 175 (2003). 
 120. See Tim Greene, Sun, Lucent Tout Encrypted E-mail Service, NET-
WORK WORLD, Nov. 21, 2005, at 40, 40; COMER, supra note 118, at 288–94 
(providing a basic overview of the e-mail encryption process). 
 121. SCHNEIER, supra note 93, at 24 (explaining that typical encryption 
keys are between 40 and 128 bits long, or 13 to 40 decimal digits). 
 122. Id. at 42. 
 123. COMER, supra note 118, at 291. 
 124. See, e.g., Cornell Univ., Primes, Modular Arithmetic, and Public Key 
Cryptography II (2004), http://www.math.cornell.edu/~mec/2003-2004/ 
cryptography/RSA/RSA.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Open2.net, Mathe-
matical Thinking, http://www.open2.net/sciencetechnologynature/maths/ 
primer.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Univ. San Francisco Cal., Public Key 
Encryption, http://www.cs.usfca.edu/~parrt/course/601/lectures/public.keys 
.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
 125. See Cornell Univ., Primes, Modular Arithmetic, and Public Key Cryp-
tography II, supra note 124. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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ring.128 Until recently, the costs of managing such key rings 
were prohibitive.129 
A growing number of software developers have introduced 
encryption suites that dramatically reduce the cost and com-
plexity of the encryption process.130 Transparency is crucial, as 
even contemplating the actual processes behind encryption can 
unnerve a computer scientist, not to mention the average 
user.131 With many current products, key management is com-
pletely automated and takes place behind the scenes.132 Simi-
larly, developers have also simplified the process of enabling 
encryption for a particular e-mail message. For one product, 
“[e]nd users wishing to encrypt a message type the trigger word 
‘secure’ in the subject line before hitting the send button.”133 
Another tool actually “scans the e-mail’s text and attachments 
and looks for combinations of words and numbers that look like 
it’s going to be [confidential] information.”134 In a 2005 evalua-
tion of available e-mail encryption suites, the University of 
Kansas’s manager of Local Area Network Support Services 
commented that “[a]ll the products proved to [the evaluators] 
that getting started with e-mail encryption is much easier than 
[one] might think.”135 
Despite these recent advances in the software industry, 
electronic communications experts suggest that “[f]ew organi-
zations employ e-mail encryption technology broadly 
enough.”136 One commentator goes so far as to direct his read-
 
 128. Rhonda M. Jenkins & Jack Seward, Protecting Your Digital Assets: 
Overcoming E-mail Insecurity, http://www.hp.com/sbso/solutions/legal/expert_ 
insights_protecting_digital_assets.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) (commenting 
that it would be “difficult to keep track of the many digital keys necessary to 
lock and unlock the volumes of encrypted messages”). 
 129. See id. (explaining that server-based e-mail solutions offering enter-
prise-level domain-to-domain encryption between attorney and client locations 
are costly and complex to implement). 
 130. See Travis Berkley, CipherTrust Tops Encryption Field, NETWORK 
WORLD, Aug. 15, 2005, at 39, 41. See generally Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, EPIC Online Guide to Practical Privacy Tools, http://www.epic.org/ 
privacy/tools.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (providing a non-exhaustive list-
ing of available e-mail encryption programs). 
 131. Berkley, supra note 130. 
 132. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 93, at 44, 208. 
 133. Paul McNamara, You’ve Got Mail, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 15, 2005, at 
36, 38. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Berkley, supra note 130, at 45. 
 136. FLYNN & KAHN, supra note 119, at 174. 
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ers to “not use the Internet for communication of confidential 
information unless it is encrypted.”137 In his analysis, he states 
that “it is generally agreed that a lawyer’s failure to use secu-
rity technology could be construed as a failure to take reason-
able precautions.”138 
As far as lawyers are concerned, however, the courts have 
yet to find that communication via unencrypted e-mail exhibits 
an intention to disclose information to a privilege-destroying 
third party.139 In fact, Bar Association committees have found 
precisely the opposite. For example, the Illinois State Bar Asso-
ciation and the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee explicitly de-
cided to allow transmission of confidential information by un-
encrypted electronic mail in 1997 and 1998, respectively.140 
Because of the widespread trend toward accepting unse-
cured e-mail as a secure method of communication, a change in 
the disposition of the various bar ethics committees will likely 
occur only after a vast majority of the legal community starts to 
employ encryption. This change may already be in progress, as 
almost one-third of large firms recently reported using encryp-
tion to secure client e-mail messages.141 A cautious user, 
whether a lawyer or a private individual, should thoroughly 
consider using encryption, especially for particularly sensitive 
communications. 
2. Introducing New E-mail Standards 
The introduction of e-mail standards is a potential alterna-
tive to using encryption as a preventative measure. For exam-
ple, many companies are adopting a “‘bright-line’ no-forwarding 
policy” in order to avoid the complications of dealing with un-
authorized forwarding.142 Such a policy reduces liability and 
provides a sense of security to those who send e-mail to persons 
 
 137. BICK, supra note 97, at 32. 
 138. Id. at 31. 
 139. Thompson et al., supra note 17, at 871–72 (citing Mitchell v. Towne, 
87 P.2d 908 (1939)). 
 140. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (1998), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/attorney_resources/opinions (discussing ethical implica-
tions of using encryption and stating that encryption is not ethically man-
dated); Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 96-10 (1997), available at http://www 
.illinoisbar.org/CourtsBull/EthicsOpinions (discussing electronic communica-
tion, the use of encryption, and ethical implications); see also Ohio Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline, Op. 99-2 (1999). 
 141. See REACH ET AL., supra note 3, at 13. 
 142. See OVERLY, supra note 3, at 17. 
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within the organization. Other e-policy experts advocate a 
sweeping requirement of obtaining the original sender’s per-
mission before forwarding an e-mail.143 This approach holds the 
additional advantage of curbing unauthorized forwarding with-
out eliminating forwards entirely. Alternatively, a universal 
shift from placing disclaimers at the end of a message to plac-
ing them at the top may improve efficacy. 
B. PUNISHMENT 
While the sender can easily apply most prevention meas-
ures himself or herself, punishment options are more cumber-
some to implement. Unfortunately, Congress appears unlikely 
to implement most proposed Internet legislation.144 Despite 
this record, claims that existing law is sufficient underestimate 
the limitations of the ECPA and other allegedly applicable 
statutes. 
Much of the existing policy regarding e-mail security as-
sumes that “intercepting an electronic mail message is illegal 
under the ECPA.”145 However, the threat of interception is 
much less troublesome compared to the threats of dissemina-
tion to unintended third parties through disclosure or unau-
thorized forwarding by a recipient.146 
In enacting the ECPA, the Senate Judiciary committee ex-
hibited intent to prevent unauthorized opening of e-mail analo-
gous to the protections afforded to first class postal mail.147 The 
law protects first class mail from unauthorized opening until it 
reaches the directed recipient, even while it sits in the mailbox 
after delivery.148 Yet, through its express limited application to 
 
 143. FLYNN, supra note 23, at 92 (“A confidential email message intended 
for a single reader could have a negative impact on the original sender if for-
warded to additional, unintended readers.”). 
 144. BICK, supra note 97, at 101. 
 145. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 140. 
 146. Claire A. Simmers & Adam Bosnian, Reducing Legal, Financial and 
Operational Risks: A Comparative Discussion of Aligning Internet Usage with 
Business Priorities Through Internet Policy Management, in MANAGING WEB 
USAGE IN THE WORKPLACE 270, 279 (Murugan Anandarajan & Claire Simmers 
eds., 2002) (discussing Twentieth Century Fox’s perception that “one key-
stroke could result in the loss of a confidential movie/TV script or contract de-
tail”). 
 147. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
 148. United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that the 
ECPA prohibits a person from taking a letter before it has been delivered to 
the person to whom it has been directed, even when the address may be out-
dated or incorrect). 
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communications interception, the ECPA does not afford this 
presumed protection to e-mail messages149 and therefore fails 
to fulfill congressional intent to place e-mail on the same pri-
vacy footing as first class mail. 
Though requiring the original sender’s permission to dis-
seminate an electronic message would eliminate the threat of 
unauthorized forwarding, such a provision would fall outside 
the original intent of the ECPA and would require new justifi-
cation.150 In fact, postal mail forwards are presently subject to 
the same laws as e-mail forwards. The only difference is that e-
mail forwards are not subject to the physical limitations that 
accompany the copying of a letter, and therefore they require 
additional limitations to achieve the same effect. Though 
unlikely,151 either a change in e-mail industry standards or a 
congressional amendment of the ECPA to ban unauthorized 
forwarding would achieve this effect. 
In order to realistically extend to e-mail the same level of 
protection as first class mail regarding delivery to the correct 
recipient, e-mail addresses and recipient names would both 
need to be required separately, much like how both an address 
and the name of a recipient are required on an envelope. Such a 
separation would greatly clarify the intent of the sender152 and 
would enable compliance with currently ineffective disclaimer 
provisions. When combined with a statutory extension of first-
class mail protections to e-mail, the security of e-mail messages 
would be greatly increased. 
  CONCLUSION   
The initial tepid response of the legal profession to client 
communication over e-mail is understandable. Despite a lack of 
advancements in the security of standard e-mail, the legal pro-
fession has nonetheless embraced e-mail as an acceptable 
means of communication. With the lawyers came the confiden-
tiality disclaimers, which are presently toothless outside the at-
torney-client privilege context. A more personal “please don’t 
copy or forward this” statement likely better serves most non-
lawyers. 
 
 149. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
 150. See id. 
 151. BICK, supra note 97, at 101. 
 152. See Krause, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
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In addition, the means of use of e-mail disclaimers has 
been more a creature of convenience than of functionality. The 
limitations of existing technology have sacrificed effectiveness. 
Unless Congress takes new steps to increase the effectiveness 
and enforceability of modern e-mail disclaimers, encryption is a 
reasonable and substantially more effective alternative privacy 
tool. 
The proposals outlined in this Note are sensible and practi-
cal extensions of existing law and policy that will better align 
practice with perception. Congress can additionally secure e-
mail through just a few slight changes in policy, without sub-
stantial deviation from the spirit of the ECPA. Not only will the 
lessened threat of unauthorized e-mail dissemination expand 
the marketplace of ideas, but existing disclaimers will also be-
come more effective as the intended recipient becomes more 
evident. 
